Japan is Back

After a period of drift, we are witnessing what appears to be another significant turning point in Japan’s recent political history, one that could raise its national spirits, economic prospects, regional contributions and global profile, as well as the outlook for India-Japan relations.  

In Japan’s Lower House election held on February 8, 2026, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi led the LDP to its largest ever victory in seven decades.  In a little over three months since she came to power, “Japan is back” under a dynamic and charismatic leader.  

In this policy brief, the author analyses developments since PM Takaichi’s assumption of office on October 21, 2025.  By defying conventional wisdom, calling for a snap election, and putting herself front and centre as the protagonist before the electorate, she has skilfully harnessed her soaring popularity to position herself as potentially another transformational leader after her political mentor, the late Shinzo Abe. 

Having inherited a demoralised LDP with its public standing on life-support, PM  Takaichi now has the opportunity to reshape the party as a nationalist-conservative leader. Her measured pronouncements after her election victory indicate a pragmatic approach towards converting her massive mandate into concrete outcomes, from bolstering social welfare to ensuring economic revival and strengthening defence capability.  

In terms of crafting Japan’s foreign policy, she is poised to engage the global arena with confidence and political headroom as, in her words, “a stable political foundation also provides significant strength for advancing robust diplomacy”.  

PM Takaichi has already made it clear that her first priority will be to make Japan the U.S.'s indispensable alliance partner in Asia, but her path may be complicated by President Trump’s unusual approach to diplomacy.  Beyond the U.S., Japan will now face a changed reality: the weakening of the “Collective West”. Having long projected itself as a model global citizen, Japan will, hopefully, continue to weigh in strongly on the side of international law-based order, not least in the Indo-Pacific.  

China looms large as Japan’s foremost challenge.  China’s unrelenting campaign of intimidation against Takaichi since November last year has clearly backfired with the Japanese public, and the stage is now set for China to deal with a popular and nationalist leader in Japan.  China’s pressure playbook may only drive PM Takaichi further in the direction of solidifying the US-Japan alliance, while also increasing Japan’s engagement with regional security frameworks.  

The author observes that India, too, will need to reshape its approach towards Japan with fresh thinking, and it will be incumbent upon our diplomacy to forge closer ties of understanding and trust with PM Takaichi and her inner circle of advisers. Both India and Japan now have leaders with nationalist credentials, with their ideological commonality bolstered by the personal ties each had enjoyed with Shinzo Abe. 

The interests of India and Japan fully converge on their role as guardians of stability, security and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific, where they will face the imperative of working even more closely together to bolster partnerships in South East Asia and maintain the role and relevance of the Quad.  

The author concludes that Japan is back, and India should embrace the opportunity this presents. Both countries will emerge stronger by working together, which has long been the defining vision of their relationship in this century. 

To read this DPG Policy Brief Vol. XI, Issue 7, please click “Japan is Back”.