US National Security Strategy 2025
The second Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) was released on December 4, 2025, and is no doubt being studied carefully across the chancelleries of the world.
In this Policy Brief, the author outlines the essential elements of US NSS 2025, including in relation to previous iterations of this foundational document which traditionally defines the ends and the means of US foreign policy and strategy across the world. He also highlights the core principles and regional priorities laid down by the NSS.
Not surprisingly, President Trump stands front and centre in a document that effectively blurs the distinction between national security issues and US domestic politics. The NSS is in parts both internationally engaged and isolationist in orientation, rejecting past notions of American domination of the world and US willingness to shoulder this burden while also maintaining US pre-eminence as the world’s strongest and most technologically and militarily advanced nation.
In terms of regional priorities, the US NSS 2025 elevates the Western Hemisphere above all others, given its importance to homeland protection, as well as access to key geographies. The US will now seek to become the hemisphere’s economic and security partner of choice, while discouraging collaboration with others, in a Trumpian remake of the Monroe Doctrine.
Asia and the Indo-Pacific come next, with the largest section of the document devoted to US interests across this region that is described as the next century’s key economic and geopolitical arena. Significant space in the NSS is occupied by China and its undesirable practices on both commercial and security fronts. However, the NSS also reflects a certain degree of ambiguity, both with regard to Chinese dominance and the reassurance on offer for US allies and partners. India receives cursory attention, and not always in a positive light, as a country that must be diplomatically managed and utilised, rather than as a strategic partner in balancing Asia. The language on Taiwan is softer.
Third in the order of regional theatres is Europe; NSS 2025 is most obviously harsh and derisive towards Europe and the EU. Russia, in contrast, is seen in more favourable light, with the US positioning itself as a mediator to mitigate the risk of conflict between Europe and Russia.
The fourth ranked priority in the NSS is the Middle East, where the US is already seen to be in an enviable position of control. Africa comes last, with a focus on harnessing its abundant natural resources and latent economic potential.
The author concludes that US NSS 2025 reflects Trump’s longstanding view that allies have taken advantage of the US and must now assume primary responsibility for security and stability in their respective regions, with the US acting as a “convenor and supporter”. The erstwhile “burden-sharing” project with allies has evolved into a “burden-shifting” framework. In an America First (and Last) document, mutuality of interests and shared benefits find little place, even as the nations of the world must contend with the strong undercurrent of unpredictability of US policies.
In sum, US NSS 2025 is unlikely to provide much comfort to US allies and partners, in Europe or Asia; it will also more likely encourage countries to diversify relationships, stand up for their national interests, and move in the direction of strategic autonomy.
To read this DPG Policy Brief Vol. X, Issue 27, please click “US National Security Strategy 2025”.
