



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power

INDIA STRATEGIC REVIEW

AUGUST 2024

Author

Deependra Singh Hooda

Volume V, Issue 8



Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, 1st Floor, India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003

www.delhipolicygroup.org



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power

India Strategic Review

Vol. V, Issue 8

August 2024

ABOUT US

Founded in 1994, the Delhi Policy Group (DPG) is among India's oldest think tanks with its primary focus on strategic and international issues of critical national interest. DPG is a non-partisan institution and is independently funded by a non-profit Trust. Over past decades, DPG has established itself in both domestic and international circles and is widely recognised today among the top security think tanks of India and of Asia's major powers.

Since 2016, in keeping with India's increasing global profile, DPG has expanded its focus areas to include India's regional and global role and its policies in the Indo-Pacific. In a realist environment, DPG remains mindful of the need to align India's ambitions with matching strategies and capabilities, from diplomatic initiatives to security policy and military modernisation.

At a time of disruptive change in the global order, DPG aims to deliver research based, relevant, reliable and realist policy perspectives to an actively engaged public, both at home and abroad. DPG is deeply committed to the growth of India's national power and purpose, the security and prosperity of the people of India and India's contributions to the global public good. We remain firmly anchored within these foundational principles which have defined DPG since its inception.

Author

Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.), PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM & Bar, Senior Fellow for Military Strategy, Delhi Policy Group

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Delhi Policy Group as an Institution.

INDIA STRATEGIC REVIEW

The ISR features an assessment of key developments, trends, and policies pertaining to India's immediate and continental neighbourhood, and is authored by Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.), Senior Fellow for Military Strategy. The research team includes Shreyas Deshmukh, Research Associate. Your comments and feedback may be addressed to Shreyas Deshmukh at shreyas@dpg.org.in. To subscribe, please [click here](#).

Cover Images:

Taliban military parade to celebrate the third anniversary of Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, at the Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan August 14, 2024. Source: [Alarabia](#)

Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as the head of Bangladesh's interim government on August 8, 2024. Source: [X/@KhaleejMag](#)

External Affairs Minister of India, Dr. S. Jaishankar, called on Dr. Mohamed Muizzu, President of the Republic of Maldives in Male, Maldives on August 10, 2024. (Source: [Dr. Jaishankar/Official X Account](#))

© 2024 by the Delhi Policy Group

Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, 1st Floor,

India Habitat Centre,

Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003.

www.delhipolicygroup.org

India Strategic Review

Vol. V, Issue 8

August 2024

Contents

THREE YEARS OF TALIBAN RULE	1
Humanitarian Crisis.....	1
Human Rights.....	2
Economy	2
Terrorism.....	3
International Acceptance of Taliban	4
PAKISTAN	4
Political Developments and the Army.....	4
Deteriorating Internal Security	5
STANDOFF AT THE INDIA-CHINA LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL (LAC)	6
Situation at the LAC	6
BANGLADESH	7
Sheikh Hasina's Ouster.....	7
Impact on India-Bangladesh Ties	8
NEPAL	10
India-Nepal Ties	10
MALDIVES	10
Visit of Minister of External Affairs of India.....	10

India's Strategic Neighbourhood

by

Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.)

THREE YEARS OF TALIBAN RULE

On August 14, the Taliban celebrated three years in power with a military parade at Bagram. At this former United States airbase, Chinese and Iranian diplomats were among hundreds who gathered for the parade and speeches on Wednesday.¹ The speeches were aimed at the international audience, with Deputy Prime Minister Maulvi Abdul Kabir stating, "No one will be allowed to interfere in internal affairs, and Afghan soil will not be used against any country."² There was no mention of the profound challenges facing the country.

Humanitarian Crisis

The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is catastrophic. With the cessation of foreign aid—which previously comprised 75% of the national budget—the country is now mired in a humanitarian disaster. Over 23 million Afghans, more than half the population, are experiencing acute food insecurity, and millions are on the brink of starvation. About 6.5 million children in Afghanistan - or nearly three out of ten - face crisis or emergency levels of hunger.³

Recurrent natural disasters have impacted Afghanistan, including droughts, floods, and earthquakes. In May and July of 2024, heavy flooding impacted areas in northeastern, northern and western regions of Afghanistan, brought on by unprecedented rainfall – leaving thousands of Afghans in urgent need of assistance. In June 2022, the worst earthquake to hit the country in the last twenty years struck Afghanistan, killing at least 1,000 people and injuring many more.⁴

Afghan refugees are the third-largest displaced population in the world after Syrian and Ukrainian refugees. Iran and Pakistan host 4.5 million and 3.1 million Afghan refugees respectively, while some 3.25 million people are internally displaced.⁵ Since September 2023, when Pakistan launched a deportation drive, 700,000 refugees have returned to Afghanistan, exacerbating the problem. A survey of families who returned to Afghanistan found that 99% did not have enough food for the next month, and two-thirds

of children were not enrolled in school, primarily due to a lack of identity documents.⁶

Human Rights

Under the Taliban, Afghanistan has become the world's only country where girls are banned from secondary education. This ban is part of a broader pattern of gender apartheid, where women are systematically excluded from public life. The Taliban have not only barred women from working in many sectors, including NGOs and government positions but have also prohibited them from appearing in public without a male guardian and from participating in most forms of social life.

On August 21, the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice released a 114-page, 35-article document laying down further restrictions. Article 13 of the ministry's new laws states that women must always veil their bodies in public, including wearing a face covering to avoid tempting men. The document further states that women are forbidden from singing or reading aloud in public, and they are not allowed to look at men unless they are related by blood or marriage. Females are also not permitted to travel alone.⁷

Beyond gender-based oppression, the Taliban have cracked down on freedom of expression, targeting journalists, activists, and former government employees. Arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings have become common, creating an atmosphere of fear and repression. Ethnic minorities, particularly the Hazara community, have also faced persecution under Taliban rule, further exacerbating social divisions within the country.

Economy

The World Bank, in its latest Afghanistan Development Update, states that Afghanistan's economic outlook remains uncertain, with the threat of stagnation looming large until at least 2025.⁸

The report states that Afghanistan's economy has been characterized by a tumultuous downturn over the past two years, underlined by a staggering 26% contraction in real GDP. The aftermath of the Taliban takeover has seen a stark decline in international aid, leaving the nation without any internal engines of growth, and the recent return of Afghan migrants and an earthquake in Herat have intensified these challenges.

The ban on opium cultivation precipitated a \$1.3 billion loss in farmers' incomes, equivalent to approximately 8 per cent of GDP. According to the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the opiate economy's value has contracted by 90 per cent, the area under cultivation declined by 95 per cent and has cost Afghan 450,000 jobs at the farm level alone and doesn't include the high economic losses downstream.

Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) has reported a significant decrease in money supply due to sanctions, frozen assets, banking disruptions, domestic payment system issues, and a shift to Islamic banking, leading to a cash-dominant economy. The country's inability to mint new currency, compounded by sanctions that prevent replacing old banknotes, has further tightened the money supply. A reduced money supply has also led to an exchange rate appreciation, exacerbating the deflationary cycle.

Structural deficiencies in the private sector and waning international support for essential services are anticipated to impede any semblance of economic progress. The trajectory for 2023-2025 envisages a persistently stagnant economy, with real GDP growth projected to flatline, leaving economic activity by 2025 at par with 2022 levels as per capita income shrinks due to population growth.

Terrorism

The Taliban have strengthened control across Afghanistan as the group transitions from an insurgency to the de facto authorities. However, several terrorist groups continue to operate within Afghanistan. The biggest threat to Afghanistan's internal security comes from the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP). The Taliban has been engaged in a brutal conflict with ISKP and has been reasonably successful, but the terrorist group retains the ability to carry out selective strikes.

The Taliban continues to have close ties with Al-Qaida and the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Al-Qaida has reduced its profile in Afghanistan to project the image of Taliban adherence to the provisions of the Doha Agreement to prevent the use of Afghan soil for terrorist purposes. However, it continues to disseminate propaganda to increase recruitment while working to rebuild its operational capability.⁹

The TTP is less restrained and has become the largest terrorist group in Afghanistan, with an estimated strength of 6,000–6,500 fighters. TTP has intensified attacks against Pakistan, significantly increasing from 573 in 2021 to 715 in 2022 and 1,210 in 2023, with the trend continuing into 2024. The largest TTP attack occurred on 9 September 2023, when more than 1,000 TTP

fighters launched a coordinated attack against two military posts in the north-western Chitral district, Pakistan, to take and hold territory.¹⁰

International Acceptance of Taliban

There is a growing international acceptance of the Taliban government because of their consolidation of power in Afghanistan and the need to engage with them to prevent the spread of terrorism. Eighteen countries have reopened their embassies in Kabul following the Taliban takeover. In January 2024, China became the first country to officially accept an ambassador appointed by the Taliban government. On August 22, the United Arab Emirates followed suit by accepting the credentials of a Taliban-appointed diplomat as the ambassador of Afghanistan.¹¹

Eighty countries have shown some level of engagement with Taliban authorities, and de facto recognition—acknowledging a new regime via noncommittal acts, without making it eligible for a seat at the United Nations—has become an accepted reality.¹²

Although official recognition of the Taliban government is unlikely in the near future due to its regressive human rights policies, there is much lesser isolation of the group compared to Taliban rule of the late 1990s.

PAKISTAN

Political Developments and the Army

On August 12, former DG ISI Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (Retd) was taken into custody and a court martial proceeding was initiated against him on charges of corruption, misuse of authority and violating the Pakistan Army Act.¹³ The arrest has significant political ramifications as Gen Faiz was considered close to former prime minister Imran Khan, and his proximity to the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leader was believed to have been one of the major reasons for the civil-military tussle at that time. Imran wanted to continue with Gen Faiz as the head of ISI, but then army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa was adamant about replacing him and ultimately succeeded.¹⁴

There are also allegations that Gen Faiz was involved in “political meddling” after his retirement and had backed the PTI. Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has claimed the former spymaster “could have had a role in what happened on May 9,” referring to the nationwide riots that broke out last year on Imran Khan’s arrest.¹⁵ In turn, Imran Khan has stated that Gen Faiz was being forced

to become approver against him and hinted that the ex-spymaster might be asked to implicate him in the May 9 incidents.¹⁶

Imran's fears are not unfounded. Federal government spokesperson for legal affairs Barrister Aqeel Malik has alleged that the PTI founder orchestrated and "properly operated" the riots that took place last year. He said, "This was premeditated. This was preplanned. It is entirely possible that Imran Khan's trial is held in a military court and the reason for that is because the Army Act will be applicable."¹⁷

The Faiz case has also brought the role of former army chief Gen Bajwa into focus. Nawaz Sharif has accused Gen Bajwa of orchestrating his removal through a combination of judicial and military manoeuvres, including his disqualification by the Supreme Court. Gen Bajwa has also been credited for installing Imran Khan in power through an engineered election in 2018. Subsequently, the Khan-Bajwa partnership fell apart, clearing the way for the return of the PML-N-led government.¹⁸

Khawaja Asif has claimed that Gen Bajwa preferred either an extension of his tenure or the appointment of Gen Faiz as his successor. He also made a startling allegation that Gen Bajwa had threatened to impose martial law in the country as he sought an extension in his term for the second time in November 2022.¹⁹

Faiz's arrest underscores the complex and contentious relationship between Pakistan's military and its civilian leadership, where the military has historically played a significant role in determining the country's political direction.

Deteriorating Internal Security

The killing spree by terrorists across Pakistan continued in August. Four Frontier Corps personnel were killed and 27 injured in an attack on their checkpoint in the Upper South Waziristan district on August 12.²⁰ The same day, the Panjgur Deputy Commissioner was killed when his vehicle was fired upon while travelling to Quetta.²¹ Fifteen policemen were killed when the riverine dacoits ambushed two police mobile vans in Rahim Yar Khan on August 20.²²

The deadliest attack of the year came on August 26, when terrorists from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) went on a rampage across Balochistan province in which at least 73 people were killed, including 21 BLA terrorists. The BLA said 800 of its fighters participated in the attacks, which were part of an operation called "Haruf", which roughly translates to "Dark Windy Storm."²³

At least 23 people were killed in the Musakhail district when armed men forcibly removed passengers from trucks and buses and shot them after verifying their identities. Those killed were all from Punjab. In Khadkocha, a group of terrorists stormed the local police station and took Levies officials hostage for several hours. In Kalat, terrorists attacked a Levies station, two hotels, and the residence of a tribal elder, besides setting alight a toll plaza on the national highway.

In Lasbela, the terrorists stormed a camp of the Frontier Corps after ramming an explosive-laden vehicle into the main gate and entered the premises under the cover of heavy gunfire. Highways in Mastung, Kalat, Bela, Turbat, and Panjgur were blocked, and a railway bridge near Kolpur was blown off, cutting Quetta off from the rest of the country.²⁴

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stated that these attacks aim to disrupt China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) development projects and drive a wedge between Islamabad and Beijing.²⁵ While China has reiterated its commitment to backing Pakistan in its counter-terrorism operations, there will undoubtedly be unease in Beijing on the repeated attacks in Balochistan targeting CPEC projects.

STANDOFF AT THE INDIA-CHINA LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL (LAC)

Situation at the LAC

The 31st meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) was held on 29th August 2024 in Beijing. As has been noticed in the last few meetings, the two sides issue their own handouts, emphasising their respective positions.

Both readouts talk about narrowing the differences to find an early resolution to outstanding issues and jointly uphold peace and tranquillity in the border areas in accordance with bilateral agreements. The Indian statement reiterates the stance "that restoration of peace and tranquility, and respect for LAC are the essential basis for restoration of normalcy in bilateral relations." China takes a narrower view of the standoff at the LAC, attempting to delink it from the overall state of ties between the two nations. Its statement talks about taking "care of each other's reasonable concerns and reach a solution acceptable to both sides as soon as possible."²⁶

In the last two months, there have been two meetings between the foreign ministers of India and China, Dr S Jaishankar and Wang Yi. In addition, two WMCC interactions have also taken place. However, there are no indications

yet of an impending breakthrough in the situation at the LAC, which is approaching its fifth winter.

BANGLADESH

Sheikh Hasina's Ouster

Student protests over the quota system in Bangladesh, which appeared to be calming down towards the end of July, saw a dramatic escalation in early August. At least 93 people, including 14 police officials, were killed across Bangladesh on August 4 as student protesters clashed with the police and activists from Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's ruling Awami League. The Interior Ministry declared an indefinite nationwide curfew in the first such move since the protests started.²⁷

On August 5, Hasina resigned after the army refused to open fire on civilians to enforce the curfew.²⁸ She immediately fled the country in a Bangladesh Air Force aircraft, landing at Hindon Airbase near New Delhi. In a national address, Bangladesh's army chief, Gen. Waker-uz-Zaman, stated that the military would form an interim government. Bangladesh President Mohammed Shahabuddin dissolved the parliament and announced the release of opposition leader and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, who had been in jail since 2018.²⁹

Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar made a statement in the parliament on August 6 on the situation in Bangladesh, acknowledging the significant tensions, deep divides, and increasing polarisation in the country's politics since the January 2024 election.³⁰ During a briefing at an all-party meeting in Parliament, Dr Jaishankar did not rule out the possibility of "external forces" playing a role in the events that led to the removal of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. He also stated that the Indian government will allow her sufficient time to determine the next steps.³¹

Several Indian media outlets published what is purportedly a speech that Bangladesh's former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina planned to make – but which she could not deliver before hastily leaving the country on August 5. In the undelivered speech, she made significant accusations against the United States, claiming it orchestrated the plan to remove her from power.³² The United States has denied any involvement in the ouster of Hasina, but it is well known that there were persistent tensions between the two countries over issues of human rights and the holding of free and fair polls.

On August 8, Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as the head of Bangladesh's interim government. The government comprises 17 advisors, many of whom are notable critics of Hasina's regime.³³

Targeted violence has been reported across Bangladesh against Awami League members and the minority Hindu community. Several Awami League leaders, including former ministers, have been arrested.³⁴ In the days following the ouster of Hasina, at least two Hindu organisations in Bangladesh and members of the minority community faced at least 205 attacks across 52 districts.³⁵ On August 10, massive rallies of Hindus were seen in Dhaka and Chittagong, demanding protection amid widespread vandalism and attacks on Hindu temples, homes and businesses.³⁶

On August 16, Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a telephone conversation with Mohammad Yunus, the head of the Interim Government of Bangladesh. During the call, the Prime Minister reaffirmed India's support for a democratic, stable, peaceful and progressive Bangladesh and underlined the importance of ensuring the safety and protection of Hindus and all other minority communities in Bangladesh.³⁷

Younis has reached out to the Hindu community and vowed to promote interfaith harmony as he hosted a reception for them coinciding with the Janmashtami festival.³⁸ However, fears will remain until the law-and-order situation is brought under control. On August 25, at least 50 people were injured in Dhaka when students clashed with hundreds of paramilitary personnel during a protest for job regularisation.³⁹

Impact on India-Bangladesh Ties

Sheikh Hasina's exit has injected uncertainties in India-Bangladesh ties. Hasina's government was seen as sympathetic to India's sensitivities, had clamped down on anti-India Islamist groups, and built a strong economic and regional connectivity partnership. India has also unequivocally backed Hasina, and many protesters viewed India's support as enabling Hasina's autocratic rule.⁴⁰

Khaleda Zia, the leader of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), who served as prime minister from 1991 to 1996 and from 2001 to 2006, had a rocky relationship with India. BNP secretary general Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir has asked India to extradite Hasina to face trial in murder and other cases registered against her.⁴¹ The BNP has also asked the interim government to cancel all agreements signed with India during the 15-year tenure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, labelling them as "secret" and "unjust."⁴²

On August 28, the government lifted the ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, less than a month after Sheikh Hasina banned it for allegedly having links to terror activities. The JI was banned from contesting polls in 2013 after high court judges ruled its charter violated the secular constitution of Bangladesh. The party was then also barred from participating in elections in 2014 and 2018, and again in January of this year.⁴³

JI chief Shafiqur Rahman has said that his party seeks harmonious and stable ties with India, but New Delhi needs to reconsider its foreign policy regarding the neighbourhood. Rahman also said the Jamaat supports close India-Bangladesh relations but also wants Bangladesh to have strong and balanced ties with Pakistan, China and the US.⁴⁴

Growing anti-India sentiment is also evident. Massive floods that struck Eastern Bangladesh in the last week of August were blamed on India. Nahid Islam, one of the two student representatives in Bangladesh's interim government, said that "India displayed inhumanity" by opening the Dumbur dam located in neighbouring Tripura "without warning."⁴⁵

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs released a statement stating, "The flooding is due to waters from the catchment downstream from the dam, which is located over 120 kilometres upstream from the Bangladesh border." The statement also said that due to heavy rain since August 21, "automatic releases have been observed." Much of the misinformation blaming India is from several social media posts that have been sharing old pictures, falsely claiming they are from the recent floods in Bangladesh.⁴⁶

While there are some signs of a shift in Bangladesh's approach to India under the interim government, it is not yet clear if this will translate into a long-term policy. Bangladesh relies heavily on India for essential imports and for access to global markets through Indian infrastructure. Any deterioration in relations could disrupt these economic ties, potentially leading to inflation, unemployment, and a slowdown in Bangladesh's economic growth.⁴⁷

India would be closely looking at how Dhaka addresses its security concerns, particularly regarding terrorism and cross-border migration. How Younis tackles these issues will be critical in the future state of bilateral relations.

NEPAL

India-Nepal Ties

Foreign Secretary of India, Vikram Misri, paid an official visit to Nepal on August 11-12, during which he held bilateral meetings with the Foreign Secretary of Nepal, Sewa Lamsal and reviewed the progress made in various bilateral initiatives and developmental projects.⁴⁸ Misri also called on President Ramchandra Paudel and Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. Nepal Foreign Minister Dr Arzu Rana Deuba, in discussion with Misri, raised issues related to air connectivity, border trade and the finalisation of the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project.⁴⁹

Misri's visit was followed by Dr Rana Deuba's visit to New Delhi from August 18 to 22. The Foreign Ministers held bilateral talks with Dr Jaishankar, in which they reviewed "the progress made in various bilateral initiatives and developmental projects and also discussed opportunities for further collaboration in the existing and new areas of mutually beneficial cooperation."⁵⁰ Both Foreign Ministers noted the unprecedented opportunities in the power sector cooperation that would be available through implementing the Long-Term Power Trade Agreement. Meanwhile, India has approved an additional 251 MW of electricity exports from Nepal, bringing the total to 1,000 MW.⁵¹ Minister Deuba also met Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during which she handed over an invitation from Nepal's Prime Minister for PM Modi to visit Nepal.⁵²

The visit had ignited hopes that the issue of stalled recruitment of Nepali Gorkhas into the Indian Army could be resolved.⁵³ However, there was no mention of this in the official handouts.

MALDIVES

Visit of Minister of External Affairs of India

The External Affairs Minister of India, Dr S Jaishankar visited Maldives from August 9-11.⁵⁴ The first high-level visit from New Delhi since Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu took office, focused on deepening cooperation across various sectors including development, security, trade, and digital innovation. During the visit, Dr Jaishankar called on President Mohamed Muizzu, and they jointly inaugurated India's Line of Credit (LoC)-assisted project. President Muizzu appreciated India's continued developmental assistance to Maldives and reaffirmed his commitment to further deepen the India-Maldives relationship.

Dr Jaishankar inaugurated several key projects, including mental health facilities, street lighting, children's speech therapy units, and special education centres. These projects underscore India's commitment to enhancing the quality of life in the Maldives. A notable achievement was the signing of an MoU between the National Payments Corporation of India and the Maldivian Ministry of Economic Development, introducing India's Unified Payments Interface (UPI) to the Maldives. This initiative is expected to boost financial inclusion and tourism in the Maldives.

Dr. Jaishankar met with the Minister for Defence, wherein, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to deepen the India-Maldives defence and security partnership. Issues discussed included India-Maldives defence and security cooperation, joint initiatives for maritime security and the shared interest in maintaining peace and stability in the region.⁵⁵

Dr Jaishankar oversaw the progress of the flagship Greater Malé Connectivity Project, which will enhance connectivity between several key islands in the Maldives. This project is crucial for the development of the Maldives' infrastructure. Symbolizing a commitment to sustainability, Dr Jaishankar participated in a tree-planting event as part of a broader initiative to enhance environmental cooperation between the two nations.

Since President Muizzu took office, there have been tensions in ties, particularly concerning the presence of Indian military personnel. Dr Jaishankar's visit marked a step forward in resetting and strengthening ties under the new Maldivian administration.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Al Jazeera. "Taliban Celebrates Three Years of Return to Power in Afghanistan." Accessed August 24, 2024. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/14/taliban-celebrates-three-years-of-return-to-power-in-afghanistan>.
- ² AP News. "The Taliban Are Celebrating 3 Years in Power, but They're Not Talking about Afghans," August 14, 2024. <https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-three-years-anniversary-68f5bc4a3cdd9d07dcecd5d6d391df5c>.
- ³ "Afghanistan Refugee Crisis Explained." Accessed August 24, 2024. <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/afghanistan-refugee-crisis-explained/>.
- ⁴ Ibid
- ⁵ "Situation Afghanistan Situation." Accessed August 24, 2024. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan>.
- ⁶ InterAction. "Afghans in Pakistan: Forced Displacement and an Uncertain Future." Accessed August 24, 2024. <https://www.interaction.org/blog/afghans-in-pakistan-forced-displacement-and-an-uncertain-future/>.
- ⁷ Newsweek. "Afghanistan's Taliban Bans Women's Voices and Bare Faces in Public," August 22, 2024. <https://www.newsweek.com/afghanistans-taliban-bans-womens-voices-bare-faces-public-1943121>.
- ⁸ World Bank. "Afghanistan's Economic Decline Continues but Private Sector Can Support Growth, Says World Bank." Text/HTML. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/05/02/afghanistan-s-economic-decline-continues-but-private-sector-can-support-growth-says-world-bank>.
- ⁹ Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2716 (2023) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. <https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/n2415600.pdf>
- ¹⁰ Ibid
- ¹¹ Greenfield, Charlotte, and Alexander Cornwell. "UAE Accepts Taliban Diplomat as Afghan Ambassador." Reuters, August 22, 2024, sec. Asia Pacific. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-appoints-ambassador-uae-first-time-since-afghanistan-takeover-2024-08-22/>.
- ¹² "Looking for Legitimacy: The Taliban's Diplomacy Campaign | The Washington Institute." Accessed August 26, 2024. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/looking-legitimacy-talibans-diplomacy-campaign>.
- ¹³ Yousaf, Kamran. "Gen Faiz Hameed Faces Court Martial." The Express Tribune, August 13, 2024. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2487654/gen-faiz-hameed-faces-court-martial>.
- ¹⁴ Ibid
- ¹⁵ Raza, Syed Irfan. "Coalition Partners Hail, PTI Keeps Mum over Court Martial." DAWN.COM, 07:59:05+05:00. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1851956>.
- ¹⁶ Asad, Malik. "Imran Fears Faiz Will Be Forced to Turn against Him." DAWN.COM, 08:45:00+05:00. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1853468>.
- ¹⁷ Guramani, Nadir. "Imran Khan's Military Trial over May 9 Cases 'Entirely Possible': PML-N's Barrister Malik." DAWN.COM, 21:14:36+05:00. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1854426>.
- ¹⁸ Dawn Epaper. "Aug 21, 2024 | The Saga of Gen Bajwa," August 21, 2024. <https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php>.
- ¹⁹ "Gen Bajwa Threatened to Impose Martial Law: Khawaja Asif." Accessed August 31, 2024. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1220406-gen-bajwa-threatened-to-impose-martial-law-khawaja-asif>.
- ²⁰ Wazir, Adam Khan. "Four FC Men Martyred in South Waziristan Attack." DAWN.COM, 08:21:25+05:00. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1852169>.
- ²¹ Shahid, Saleem. "Panjgur DC Killed in Attack on Quetta-Karachi Highway." DAWN.COM, 07:44:15+05:00. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1851938>.
- ²² "15 Cops Martyred as Kutcha Dacoits Ambush Police." Accessed September 1, 2024. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2490301/15-cops-martyred-as-kutcha-dacoits-ambush-police>.
- ²³ ABC News. "What Is Operation 'Dark Windy Storm'? The Audacious Attacks That Took a Pakistani Province by Surprise." August 27, 2024. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-27/pakistan-baloch-liberation-army-balochistan-terror-attack/104275968>.
- ²⁴ Shahid, Saleem. "Balochistan Plunges Deeper into Militancy Vortex." DAWN.COM, 08:52:14+05:00. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1855006>.
- ²⁵ The Indian Express. "China Condemns Balochistan Attacks, Vows Support for Pakistan's Counter-Terrorism Efforts | World News," August 27, 2024. <https://indianexpress.com/article/world/china-balochistan-attacks-vows-support-for-pakistan-9535425/>.
- ²⁶ R, Senjo M. "India, China Discuss LAC at 31st WMCC Meet, Seek to Ease Differences." Rediff. Accessed September 1, 2024. <https://www.rediff.com/news/report/india-china-discuss-lac-at-31st-wmcc-meet-seek-to-ease-differences/20240829.htm>.
- ²⁷ The Wire. "Bangladesh: More Than 90 Killed, Several Injured as Student Protests Escalate." Accessed August 26, 2024. <https://thewire.in/south-asia/bangladesh-more-than-60-killed-several-injured-as-student-protests-escalate>.
- ²⁸ "Exclusive: Bangladesh Army Refused to Suppress Protest, Sealing Hasina's Fate | The Business Standard." Accessed August 26, 2024. <https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/exclusive-bangladesh-army-refused-suppress-protest-sealing-hasinas-fate-911496>.
- ²⁹ Ripon, Isaac Yee, Tanbirul Miraj. "Bangladesh Prime Minister Flees to India as Anti-Government Protesters Storm Her Residence." CNN, August 5, 2024. <https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/05/asia/bangladesh-prime-minister-residence-stormed-intl/index.html>.
- ³⁰ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Suo Moto Statement by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar in Lok Sabha on the Situation in Bangladesh." Accessed August 27, 2024. https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/38098/Suo_moto_statement_by_EAM_Dr_S_Jaishankar_in_Lok_Sabha_on_the_situation_in_Bangladesh.
- ³¹ Nair, Sobhana K. "India Has Assured Help to Sheikh Hasina: Jaishankar Tells at All-Party Meet amid Bangladesh Crisis." The Hindu, August 6, 2024, sec. India. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/all-party-meeting-on-bangladesh/article68491231.ece>.

- ³² "The Bad Blood Between Sheikh Hasina and the US." Accessed August 31, 2024. <https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/the-bad-blood-between-sheikh-hasina-and-the-us/>.
- ³³ The Indian Express. "Inside Muhammad Yunus-Led Bangladesh Interim Government: Who Got What | World News," August 9, 2024. <https://indianexpress.com/article/world/bangladesh-muhammad-yunus-interim-government-portfolios-9505324/>.
- ³⁴ "Ex Bangladesh Minister Arrested Amid Crackdown On Awami League Leaders." Accessed August 27, 2024. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/bangladeshs-ex-textile-and-jute-minister-golam-dastagir-gazi-arrested-6413594>.
- ³⁵ Livemint. "Over 200 Attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh in Fallout of Sheikh Hasina Govt, BNP Leader Says 'Some Taking Advantage' | Today News." mint, August 11, 2024. <https://www.livemint.com/news/world/bangladesh-violence-hindus-under-attack-sheikh-hasina-interim-govt-muhammad-yunus-bnp-khaleda-zia-refugee-crisis-india-11723339440596.html>.
- ³⁶ "Bangladesh Violence: Massive Hindu Rallies in Dhaka, Chittagong Seek Protection from Attacks on Homes, Temples - BusinessToday." Accessed August 27, 2024. <https://www.businesstoday.in/world/story/bangladesh-violence-massive-hindu-rallies-in-dhaka-chittagong-seek-protection-from-attacks-on-homes-temples-441051-2024-08-11>.
- ³⁷ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Prime Minister Receives Telephone Call from the Chief Adviser, Interim Government of Bangladesh." Accessed August 27, 2024. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38165/Prime_Minister_receives_telephone_call_from_the_Chief_Adviser_Interim_Government_of_Bangladesh.
- ³⁸ NDTV.com. "'There Can't Be Any Divisions Among People': Muhammad Yunus To Hindu Leaders." Accessed August 27, 2024. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/bangladesh-hindus-violence-there-cant-be-any-divisions-among-people-muhammad-yunus-to-hindu-leaders-6422818>.
- ³⁹ Standard, Business. "Bangladesh Crisis: Students Clash with Paramilitary Personnel, 50 Injured," August 25, 2024. https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/bangladesh-crisis-students-clash-with-paramilitary-personnel-50-injured-124082600072_1.html.
- ⁴⁰ "Bangladesh: Why Many No Longer See India as a Friend." Accessed August 27, 2024. <https://theprint.in/world/dont-say-youre-indian-wont-return-in-one-piece-why-many-bangladeshis-no-longer-see-india-as-a-friend/2236854/>.
- ⁴¹ The Times of India. "BNP Asks India to Extradite PM Sheikh Hasina for Trial in Bangladesh." August 21, 2024. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/bnp-asks-india-to-extradite-pm-sheikh-hasina-for-trial-in-bangladesh/articleshow/112666680.cms>.
- ⁴² The Daily Herald. "BNP Demands Cancellation of 'Unjust' Agreements with India from Sheikh Hasina's Tenure." Accessed August 27, 2024. <https://thedailyherald.in/news-details/bnp-demands-cancellation-of-unjust-agreements-with-india-from-sheikh-hasinas-tenure>.
- ⁴³ AFP. "Bangladesh Govt Lifts Ban on Jamaat." DAWN.COM, 08:10:10+05:00. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1855417>.
- ⁴⁴ Hindustan Times. "Bangladesh Interim Government Lifts Ban on Jamaat-e-Islami," August 28, 2024. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/bangladesh-interim-government-lifts-ban-on-jamaateislami-101724840443155.html>.
- ⁴⁵ Phillips, Rebecca Wright, Anna Coren, Salman Saeed, Mark. "Millions in This Country Are Stranded by Flooding. Many Blame Their Neighbor." CNN, August 26, 2024. <https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/26/asia/bangladesh-flood-disaster-india-intl-hnk-dst/index.html>.
- ⁴⁶ dw.com. "No, India Did Not Cause 'Artificial' Flooding in Bangladesh - DW - 08/27/2024." Accessed August 27, 2024. <https://www.dw.com/en/fact-check-no-india-did-not-cause-artificial-flooding-in-bangladesh/a-70059159>.
- ⁴⁷ "A New Bangladesh Is Emerging But It Needs India Too." Accessed August 31, 2024. <https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/a-new-bangladesh-is-emerging-but-it-needs-india-too/>.
- ⁴⁸ "Visit of Foreign Secretary Shri Vikram Misri to Nepal (August 11-12, 2024)." Accessed September 1, 2024. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38151/Visit_of_Foreign_Secretary_Shri_Vikram_Misri_to_Nepal_August_1112_2024.
- ⁴⁹ "Vikram Misri Heads Home after Two-Day Nepal Visit." Accessed September 1, 2024. <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/08/13/vikram-misri-heads-home-after-two-day-nepal-visit>.
- ⁵⁰ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Visit of Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nepal, H.E Dr. Arzu Rana Deuba to India." Accessed September 1, 2024. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38180/Visit_of_Minister_for_Foreign_Affairs_of_Nepal_HE_Dr_Arzu_Rana_Deuba_to_India.
- ⁵¹ PRactice, Abhishek. "Nepal to Export Additional 251 MW of Electricity to India." IndBiz | Economic Diplomacy Division, August 20, 2024. <https://indbiz.gov.in/nepal-to-export-additional-251-mw-of-electricity-to-india/>.
- ⁵² "Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nepal H.E. Dr. Arzu Rana Deuba Meets Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi." Accessed September 1, 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2046818>.
- ⁵³ Shrotryia, Ujjwal. "Resumption Of Nepali Gorkha Recruitment In Indian Army On The Cards, As Nepal's Foreign Minister Visits India." Swarajya by Kovai Media Private Limited. Accessed September 1, 2024. <https://swarajyamag.com/defence/resumption-of-nepali-gorkha-recruitment-in-indian-army-on-the-cards-as-nepals-foreign-minister-visits-india>.
- ⁵⁴ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Visit of External Affairs Minister to Maldives (August 09-11, 2024)." Accessed September 1, 2024. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38149/Visit_of_External_Affairs_Minister_to_Maldives_August_0911_2024.
- ⁵⁵ ANI. "Jaishankar Meets Maldives Defence Minister Maumoon, Discusses Joint Initiatives for Maritime Security." ThePrint, August 10, 2024. <https://theprint.in/world/jaishankar-meets-maldives-defence-minister-maumoon-discusses-joint-initiatives-for-maritime-security/2217604/>.



Delhi Policy Group
Core 5A, 1st Floor,
India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road
New Delhi - 110003
India

www.delhipolicygroup.org