



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power



POLICY BRIEF


The Quad's Expanding Agenda

Author

Lalit Kapur

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Core 5A, 1st Floor, India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003

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Author

Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retd.), Senior Fellow for Maritime Strategy, Delhi Policy Group

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Dr S Jaishankar, Foreign Ministers of Australia and Japan and Secretary of State of the United States of America at the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Tokyo, July 29, 2024: Source: [Kamikawa Yoko Official Twitter Account](#)

President Joseph R Biden, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 2023 Quad Leaders' Summit, Hiroshima, May 20, 2023. Source: Australian Government

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The Quad's Expanding Agenda

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Lalit Kapur

Since its resurrection at the official level in 2017¹, the deliberations of the Quadrilateral Dialogue, or Quad, have generated considerable geopolitical interest across the Indo-Pacific. Quad Foreign Ministers began meeting periodically after their first meeting on September 26, 2019 in Tokyo². The Biden Administration elevated discussions to the summit level on March 12, 2021³. Since 2022, Quad Foreign Ministers have met twice every year, once on the sidelines of the UNGA session, and once hosted by a member country. Five summits (including two virtual) and eight ministerial meetings have been held since the Quad's inception, with the latest being the recently concluded meeting of Foreign Ministers in Tokyo on July 29, 2024⁴.

Quad countries have a total population of over 1.9 billion, or about a quarter of the world population. They have a combined nominal GDP in excess of \$39.6 trillion⁵, about 37.9% of world GDP. They account for 18% of the global two-way trade in goods and services and 44% of the two-way trade across the Indo-Pacific⁶. They hold 30% of Global FDI stock, 22% of which is invested in the Indo-Pacific. They account for 16% of global exports, 20% of global imports, and 34% of the world's scientific publications. The Quad remains unique in that it is not a security or economic alliance, but a strategic partnership of four like-minded democratic nations working cohesively to act as a force for good, strive for rules-based stability, and deliver public goods across the Indo-Pacific. How effectively has it delivered on this objective?

¹ India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific, November 12, 2017, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_on_IndoPacific_November_12_2017

² Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Ministerial, September 26, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page3e_001112.html

³ Quad Leaders' Joint Statement: "The spirit of the Quad", March 12, 2021, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33620/Quad_Leaders_Joint_Statement_The_Spirit_of_the_Quad

⁴ Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting Joint Statement, Tokyo 29 July 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38044/Quad_Foreign_Ministers_Meeting_Joint_Statement

⁵ Sourced from IMF World Economic Outlook, July 2024.

⁶ Source: World Trade Organisation.

Vision and Principles

The Quad's vision and principles were spelt out in a vision statement by the leaders on May 20, 2023⁷. This vision is for an Indo-Pacific region that is peaceful and prosperous, stable and secure, respectful of sovereignty and political independence, free from intimidation and coercion, where disputes are settled in accordance with international law, and where all countries and peoples can exercise free choice on how they cooperate and trade based on partnership, equality and mutual respect. This effectively translates into providing regional nations with an alternative to China's overbearing influence and coercive assertions. The partner nations seek to make a positive and lasting contribution to the resilience and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific by leveraging their combined resources and sharing expertise, working with countries of the region and guided by their priorities.

Four principles guide the Quad's response to regional challenges⁸. First, a commitment to bringing tangible benefits to the Indo-Pacific by providing options that build resilience, open communication and economic growth. Second, strengthening stability in a region where competition is managed responsibly, and upholding the international order based on the rule of law. Third, acknowledging and respecting the centrality, agency and leadership of regional institutions, including ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). And fourth, implementing a practical agenda that delivers sustained economic and social value, is responsive to needs of regional partners, and contributes to global priorities.

The Quad Agenda - HADR

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) was what brought the Quad countries together for the first time, in response to the devastating Boxing Day tsunami of 2004. That version of the Quad did not survive China's aggressive pushback. Interestingly, it was the same coercive influence and the consequential agreement among partners that a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific was in the interests of all countries of the region and the

⁷ Quad Leaders' Vision Statement – Enduring Partners for the Indo-Pacific, May 20, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36573/Quad_Leaders_Vision_Statement_Enduring_Partners_for_the_IndoPacific

⁸ Ibid.

world at large that was responsible for resurrecting the Quad in 2017⁹. HADR has been a part of the Quad agenda since the first ministerial meeting in 2019.

During their virtual summit in March 2022, the Quad leaders decided to stand up a new HADR mechanism that would enable the Quad to meet future humanitarian challenges in the Indo-Pacific¹⁰. Establishment of the Quad HADR partnership was announced during the in-person Summit on May 22, 2022¹¹. Foreign Ministers signed into operation guidelines for the Quad Partnership for HADR in the Indo-Pacific in September 2022¹². As of the recent Quad Ministerial Meeting, the Quad HADR Standard Operating Procedures have been finalised. Tabletop exercises to enhance coordination have been held annually since 2022, and the next is scheduled in Japan this year. Quad partners have provided assistance to Papua New Guinea in the aftermath of a deadly landslide in May 2024. The HADR partnership has now become fully functional as a valuable humanitarian response resource for the Indo-Pacific.

Maritime Security

Maritime security and stability are foundational pre-requisites of the free and open Indo-Pacific that the Quad seeks. This is underpinned by a shared commitment to international maritime law, including UNCLOS, and has formed part of the Quad's agenda from its inception. Quad statements regularly reiterate strong opposition to unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion, serious concern about the militarisation of disputed features and coercive and intimidating manoeuvres in the South China Sea, as well as the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels and efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resource exploitation activities. A recent evolution of the Quad position is the statement that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016 is a significant milestone, and the basis for peacefully resolving disputes between parties in the South China Sea.

⁹ India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific, November 12, 2017, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_on_IndoPacific_November_12_2017

¹⁰ Joint Readout of Quad Leaders Call, March 03, 2022, http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34928/joint_readout_of_quad_leaders_call

¹¹ Quad Joint Leaders' Statement, May 24, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000401.html

¹² Guidelines for Quad Partnership in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific, September 23, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/guidelines-for-quad-partnership-on-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief-hadr-in-the-indo-pacific/>

Statements, however, are not enough to ensure maritime security against the wide variety of challenges, including IUU fishing, illicit movements of people, weapons, drugs and other contraband, piracy and terrorism that abound in the maritime domain. Achieving such security necessitates domain awareness and the building of requisite enforcement capacity. In May 2022, Quad leaders announced the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative (IPMDA)¹³. Its focal area was the Southern Pacific Island states and Southeast Asia. Quad Ministers have in July 2024 announced their intent to expand the IPMDA to the Indian Ocean Region and are working for early operationalisation of the South Asia Program through the Indian Navy's IFC-IOR located in Gurugram¹⁴. The IPMDA will enhance domain awareness of regional countries in its area of coverage, which is limited to the Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) and does not extend into the Western Indian Ocean. Capacity building is not yet, however, being addressed collectively by the Quad, though that is being done by the partners at the bilateral level.

Health

Health came to the forefront as part of the Quad agenda at the inaugural Quad Summit, when leaders committed to join forces to "expand safe, affordable and effective vaccine production" and to collaborate to "strengthen equitable vaccine access for the Indo-Pacific"¹⁵. Biological-E Ltd., a Hyderabad based company, was designated to manufacture 1.2 billion doses of the vaccine for use in Southeast Asia by end 2022¹⁶, with funding to be provided by the US and Japan, and distribution by Japan and Australia. Delays in provision of finance meant that the company could scale up capacity to manufacture 50 million doses per month of the selected J&J vaccine only by end 2022. The vaccine did not receive emergency use approval of the World Health Organisation (WHO) due to possible clotting risks. Only India distributed vaccines across the Indo-Pacific under the Quad initiative, other partners focused on distribution through COVAX.

¹³ Quad Joint Leaders' Statement, May 24, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1e_000401.html

¹⁴ For an overview of the IPMDA, see Lalit Kapur, "Assessing the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness", June 23, 2022, https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/uploads_dpg/publication_file/assessing-the-indo-pacific-partnership-for-maritime-domain-awareness-3881.pdf

¹⁵ Quad Leaders' Joint Statement: "The Spirit of the Quad", March 12, 2021, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33620/Quad_Leaders_Joint_Statement_The_Spirit_of_the_Quad

¹⁶ Joint Statement from Quad Leaders, September 24, 2021, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34318/Joint_Statement_from_Quad_Leaders

Quad partners announced the evolution of their vaccine partnership to a broader Quad Health Security Partnership at their May 2023 summit¹⁷. This was intended to build the region's capacity to detect and respond rapidly to outbreaks of diseases with epidemic and pandemic potential. A year later, two tabletop exercises, one in Hawaii and one in Japan, have been held towards this end. Training has also been imparted to health specialists in Southeast Asia to build capacity to respond to regional health emergencies.

Climate Change

Combating climate change has also been part of the Quad agenda since the inaugural summit¹⁸. At the second Summit, leaders invited Los Angeles, Mumbai, Sydney and Yokohama to form network dedicated to greening and decarbonising the shipping value chain¹⁹. A Quad Shipping Task Force was set up to establish two to three low or zero-emission shipping corridors by 2030. A clean hydrogen partnership was announced to strengthen and reduce costs across all elements of the clean-hydrogen value chain. A Climate and Information services Task Force was convened and announcement made that a new technical facility to assist small island developing states would be set up under the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI).

The 2023 Summit witnessed the Quad establishing joint principles for clean energy supply chains²⁰. The Quad Climate and Information Services Initiative was established to build capacity, cooperation and information-sharing mechanisms for climate data in the Indo-Pacific. A Quad Indo-Pacific Oceans Research Alliance (QIPORA) was established to link lead ocean research agencies in the four Quad countries and exchange data on the Indian and Pacific Oceans. A Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP) was set up to enhance climate and clean energy cooperation and promote adaptation and resilience to climate impact.

¹⁷ Quad Leaders' Joint Statement, May 20, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/quad-leaders-joint-statement/>

¹⁸ Quad Leaders' Joint Statement: "The Spirit of the Quad", March 12, 2021, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33620/Quad_Leaders_Joint_Statement_The_Spirit_of_the_Quad

¹⁹ Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders' Summit, September 24, 2021, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34319/Fact_Sheet_Quad_Leaders_Summit

²⁰ Quad Statement of Principles on Clean Energy Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific, May 20, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36572/Quad_Statement_of_Principles_on_Clean_Energy_Supply_Chains_in_the_IndoPacific

Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism is yet another area that has been part of Quad deliberations since the inaugural summit. Leaders are united in condemning terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, including cross-border terrorism. They seek concerted action against all UN-listed terrorist groups including Al-Qa'ida, ISIS/Daesh, Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and their proxy groups. The first meeting of the Quad Working Group on Counter-Terrorism took place in Honolulu and held the fourth tabletop exercise in December 2023. The next meeting of the working group and tabletop is scheduled for November 2024 in Japan.

Connectivity and Infrastructure

Spurred by China's Belt and Road Initiative and its opaque lending practices, quality infrastructure and connectivity have been amongst the earliest Quad thrust areas, dating back to the first Quad Ministerial Meeting of September 2019²¹. A number of initiatives in this area are now functional. The Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group was announced at the Summit in September 2021. During the 2022 summit, Quad leaders announced their intent to extend more than \$ 50 billion in infrastructure assistance and investment in the Indo-Pacific over the next five years²². At the 2023 Summit, they announced the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience. A Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre has been established in Australia, and over 1000 telecom executives trained under the CABLES programme of the US. A Quad Infrastructure Fellowships Program that aims to empower more than 1800 practitioners across the Indo-Pacific with the skills to build quality infrastructure through university scholarships, mid-career professional exchange programs, senior government executive programs and in-country training positions, was also established. The number of fellowships under this program have subsequently been expanded to 2200. A workshop has been organised by the CDRI towards strengthening power sector resilience in the Indo-Pacific.

²¹ Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Ministerial, September 26, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page3e_001112.html

²² Quad Joint Leaders' Statement, May 24, 2022, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/35357/Quad_Joint_Leaders_Statement

Critical and Emerging Technology, Cyber Security

Governance of critical and emerging technology is one of the initial areas of Quad cooperation from the first Summit²³. By the May 2022 Quad Summit, the partners had mapped collective capacity and vulnerabilities in global semiconductor supply chains and launched the Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains²⁴. In May 2023, the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group published an Open RAN Security Report²⁵. Leaders announced cooperation with Palau to establish the deployment of Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN) capabilities, the first in the Pacific²⁶. They also published a joint statement of principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards²⁷. A Quad International Standards Cooperation Network (Q-ISCN) was launched to increase situational awareness, coordination and influence in international standards development. A Quad Investors Network (QUIN) was launched to foster private sector investment in critical and emerging technologies across Quad countries and in the Indo-Pacific. The inaugural Quad Technology Business and Investment Forum was also launched. Quad partners announced the Advancing Innovation to Empower Nextgen Agriculture (AI-ENGAGE) initiative. A Memorandum of Cooperation to advance innovation in agriculture and empower farmers everywhere to increase yield and resistance is to be signed at the next Quad Leaders' Summit.

The Quad has also been working to expand cybersecurity cooperation and strengthen cyber resilience and critical infrastructure protection from the first summit. Joint principles have been developed to promote common practices for the protection of critical infrastructure from cyber threats²⁸. Joint

²³ Quad Leaders' Joint Statement: "The Spirit of the Quad", March 12, 2021, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33620/Quad_Leaders_Joint_Statement_The_Spirit_of_the_Quad

²⁴ Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders' Tokyo Summit 2022, May 23, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022/>

²⁵ Open RAN Security Report, May 2023, <https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/resource/download/quad-open-ran-security-report.pdf>

²⁶ Quad Leaders' Summit Fact Sheet, Hiroshima, 20 May 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/quad-leaders-summit-fact-sheet/>

²⁷ Quad Principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards, May 20, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36575/Quad_Principles_on_Critical_and_Emerging_Technology_Standards

²⁸ Quad Cybersecurity Partnership Joint Principles, <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/qscg-joint-principles.pdf>

principles have also been developed for secure software²⁹. An international conference on cyber capacity building is to be held in the Philippines and a Quad Cyber Bootcamp in India later this year. The first Quad Cyber Challenge took place in 2023, a second challenge to strengthen individual and community cyber security awareness is scheduled for later in the year.

Other Quad Initiatives

Three other Quad initiatives were launched in 2023. On the education front, the leaders' announced that 100 students each year (25 from each partner country) would be provided STEM fellowships to pursue Masters and Doctoral degrees in STEM fields in the US. The program is administered by Schmidt Futures in consultation with non-governmental task force members from each country. The first batch of students began their curriculum in the US in August 2023; the second batch will begin in 2024.

In space cooperation, a Quad Space Working Group Extreme Precipitation Committee was announced in May 2022. The committee has hosted workshops to strengthen collaboration among countries and build capacity in the region. A Quad Satellite Data Portal was established in 2022, workshops have been held to examine earth observation datasets and downstream capacity building applications.

The Quad has also committed to protecting the information environment by supporting media freedom as well as addressing foreign information manipulation and interference.

Position on Regional Issues

Quad ministers have, during their recent meeting in Tokyo, formulated a balanced and common position on five issues of global concern that could create an impression of disunity in the partnership if left unaddressed³⁰. On Ukraine, they expressed their deepest concern over the ongoing war, calling for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with international law, consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. They shared the view that the

²⁹ Quad Cybersecurity Partnership: Joint Principles for Secure Software, May 20, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36574/Quad_Cybersecurity_Partnership_Joint_Principles_for_Secure_Software

³⁰ Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting Joint Statement, Tokyo, 29 July 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38044/Quad_Foreign_Ministers_Meeting_Joint_Statement

use or threat of nuclear weapons in Ukraine is unacceptable. The ministers condemned North Korea's destabilising launches using ballistic missile technology and its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons in violation of UNSC resolutions, expressing grave concern over North Korea's use of proliferation linkages, malicious cyber activity and workers abroad to fund its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. They remained concerned about the worsening political, security and humanitarian situation in Myanmar and called for immediate cessation of violence, the release of all those unjustly detained, safe and unhindered humanitarian assistance, resolution of the crisis through constructive and inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders, and a return to the path of inclusive democracy. They shared great interest in achieving peace and stability in the Middle East, unequivocally condemning the terror attacks of October 7, 2023, describing the large-scale loss of civilian lives and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza as unacceptable, calling for the release of all hostages, emphasising the urgent need to increase delivery of life saving humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza, and espousing commitment to a viable and independent Palestinian state, taking into account Israel's legitimate security concerns, as part of a two state solution. They also joined hands in condemning the ongoing attacks perpetrated by the Houthis against international and commercial vessels transiting through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

China's Response

China's spokesperson, as expected, criticised the Quad Foreign Ministers joint statement, saying that while the Quad kept chanting the slogan of a free and open Indo-Pacific, it was engaging in scaremongering, inciting antagonism and confrontation, and holding back other countries' development³¹. He reiterated that China firmly upholds its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and is committed to properly settling bilateral maritime issues with countries directly concerned through dialogue and consultation. Describing the presence of military vessels of extra-regional countries as the biggest threat and challenge to regional peace and stability, he said China firmly opposes the bloc confrontation they incite in the name of "anti-coercion", and the imposition of their house rules in the name of maintaining order.

³¹ Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian's Regular Press Conference on July 29, 2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202407/t20240729_11462585.html

Observations

Maritime security, among the Quad's primary focal areas, has a military component – that of deterring or addressing any unilateral change of status quo using force. The Quad, however, does not have an overt military role, to avoid conveying the impression of an "Asian NATO". Partner countries do come together annually in Exercise Malabar, the next edition of which is expected to be held in the Indian Ocean in October 2024. They also participate in a range of bilateral and multilateral exercises such as AUSINDEX, JIMEX, RIMPAC, Pitch Black and Talisman Sabre. They are linked together with a range of logistics and other access agreements that extend their reach. It could thus be said that the Quad's military element is recessed, in response to Southeast Asian sensitivities. That the deterrence provided has worked so far could be concluded from the fact that China, despite its military superiority, has not resorted to force to resolve disputes in the South and East China Seas, and has confined itself to grey zone coercion. For the time being, there is no benefit in militarisation of the Quad.

The Quad's geopolitical footprint mainly focuses on South East Asia and the Southern Pacific. The Indian Ocean is secondary, while the East China Sea and Japan's Northern seas do not figure in Quad initiatives. Expansion of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative to South Asia, as committed by Quad ministers in their recent summit, will provide an Indian Ocean footprint, albeit limited to the Eastern Indian Ocean. Networking IFC-IOR Gurugram in the Western Indian Ocean will have to be addressed separately through the US CENTCOM. Quad ministers have come up with a shared position on Houthi activity that has severely restricted commercial shipping and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, but whether this actually translates into any Quad initiatives to address the problem remains to be seen. Quad leaders have also committed to working through IORA and supporting its Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, but initiatives will have to be generated by IORA itself. Hopefully, with India joining the IORA troika, this aspect will receive some attention.

There has been talk of Quad expansion, particularly in the media in South Korea and Japan. This appears to be speculative, with no indication that the Quad is actually considering such expansion.

Quad leaders have not met since their May 2023 summit, which should have been held in Sydney but was relocated at short notice to Hiroshima to accommodate President Biden's schedule. Quad ministers have indicated that the next summit will be held in New Delhi during the current year. But given

the demands and uncertainties of the US presidential election, this remains to be seen.

Finally, will continued progress of the Quad seamlessly transition through the change of US administration? In the event of a Republican victory in the elections, it needs to be recalled that the Ministerial meetings in September 2019 and October 2020, wherein Quad Foreign Ministers agreed to meet regularly, were instituted under the Trump Administration. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that a future Democratic administration will abandon what was one of President Biden's signature initiatives. The China challenge in the Indo-Pacific will remain, so the Quad will likely survive, and prosper.

As emphasised by India's External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar at the recent foreign ministers' meeting, the Quad is now deeply embedded in the foreign policies of its members; its agenda is expansive; it generates practical outcomes; it brings together democratic polities and market economies as a powerful stabilising factor in a volatile world; it reinforces benefits of bilateral and trilateral activities among its partners; and it is a great contemporary example of international cooperation among trusted partners.

Conclusion

Shortly after the Quad was resuscitated in 2017, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi mocked it as a "headline-grabbing idea" and "sea foam that would soon dissipate". Far from dissipating, the Quad has gone from strength to strength. Its agenda covers a broad canvas, from HADR to broader maritime security, health, climate change, counterterrorism, connectivity, critical and emerging technology, cybersecurity, space, education, countering disinformation and more. Its geographic focus remains Southeast Asia and the Southern Pacific Island nations, with some limited potential for expansion into the Indian Ocean.

Nor has the Quad emerged as an "Asian NATO". Quad countries do come together every year in Exercise Malabar. This does not, however, form part of the Quad's agenda. The collective military capability remains recessed, and Quad leaders have been careful to refute all comparisons to a military alliance.

If concern about antagonising China resulted in the demise of the first edition of the Quad, it is concern about China's coercive activities that have sparked its resuscitation and is likely to propel its continued progress. How the Quad will grow in the future will be determined at the next Quad Leaders' Summit to be

hosted by India, by the buy-in of the incoming US administration as much as by India's role and leadership.



Delhi Policy Group
Core 5A, 1st Floor,
India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road
New Delhi - 110003
India

www.delhipolicygroup.org