DPG Indo-Pacific Monitor

Indo Pacific Monitor

Date: November 01, 2021
The month began with the publication of a Strategic Guidance from Secretary of the Navy to the US Navy and Marine Corps.  Given the salience of maritime power in maintaining US global presence, this document was expected to provide an insight into how the current administration intends to tackle growing maritime challenges, but instead identified the most pressing challenges as the four Cs: China, Culture, Climate Change and COVID, mingling   old policies with current ‘woke’ concerns, which seem to have become elements of US military strategy.  If the guidance reflects elements of Defense Secretary Austin’s forthcoming National Defense Strategy, the latter is likely to be disappointing.
 
USS Connecticut, the second of the USN’s Seawolf Class attack submarines, struck an object while submerged in the South China Sea on October 2 and was forced to limp back to Guam on the ocean surface.  The incident generated considerable commentary and China tried to exploit it to generate anti-US sentiment while also propagating its own revisionist version of the laws of the sea. 
 
Early October also witnessed a sharp rise in the number of intrusions by PRC aircraft into Taiwan’s South-western ADIZ, with a record 140 intrusions being reported in just the first four days of the month.  Numbers tapered off to more normal levels of 2-5 aircraft per day thereafter.  Tensions in the region rose, with President Biden appearing to commit the US to Taiwan’s defence in the event of a Chinese attack, only for the White House to retract and clarify that there is no change in the US policy of strategic ambiguity.  Japan and Australia also expressed concern about China’s actions towards Taiwan.  China on its part continued to test the ground and maintain pressure on Taiwan.
 
The fifth Japan India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (JIMEX) was conducted in the Arabian Sea from October 06-08, 2021.  It indicated that while there has been growth in expanding the levels of interoperability and reach of the two navies, much more needs to be done to fulfil the promise of the bilateral strategic partnership. 
 
The second phase of Exercise Malabar was held in the Bay of Bengal from October 12-15.  Admiral Michael Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations of the USN, visited India during the same period and hosted the senior leadership of the Indian Navy on board USS Carl Vinson.
 
Media reports on October 17 indicated that China had tested hypersonic missiles in July and August this year, displaying a new military capability that was described by the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff as close to a ‘Sputnik moment’.  An arms race involving hypersonic missiles is dawning, and will impact India.
 
As Exercise Malabar ended, CSG-21 led by HMS Queen Elizabeth entered the Bay of Bengal and took part in a Multilateral Partnership Exercise from October 15- 18, involving ships that had participated in Malabar, except those from the Indian Navy.  Ships of CSG-21 then dispersed to different South Asian ports, with HMS Queen Elizabeth going on to Mumbai where the British Foreign Secretary, Elizabeth Tuss; the Chief of Defence Staff General Sir Nicholas Carter and the First Sea Lord Admiral Tony Radakin all came together to host the Indian military and business leaders on board.  The ships thereafter took part in the maiden India-UK tri-service Exercise Konkan Shakti. 
 
Late October say ASEAN holding its annual summit and projecting hopes for a future in which it retains ‘centrality’.  For India, notable aspects were the agreement to strengthen ASEAN-India economic relations including through enhanced utilisation and effective implementation of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement, the full ratification of the ASEAN-India Investment Agreement by all parties, implementation of the ASEAN-India Trade in Services Agreement by all parties, and an invitation to India to join RCEP when it determined it was able to.  India and ASEAN also sought to deepen the ASEAN-India strategic partnership by exploring potential cooperation between the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and India’s Indo-Pacific Ocean’s Initiative, for which 21 potential areas of cooperation were identified.