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DPG Policy Brief
Letter from Japan: The Tokyo Drift and India
Date: February 10, 2025
No foreign power exercises influence over the affairs of Japan as does the United States, and the US-Japan alliance is the unshakable cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy. Having framed its post-Shinzo Abe policies based on the pre-eminence of Western interests and dominance in the global order, and burdened with a weaker leadership, Japan stands at a difficult crossroads as it adjusts to the reality of US President Donald Trump’s “America First” policies.
In this brief, the author shares his impressions of the prevailing mood in Tokyo flowing from interactions at the Tokyo Global Dialogue VI hosted by The Japan Institute of International Affairs on January 29-30, 2025. He also outlines the changes in Japan’s policy orientation in the post-Abe era, assesses the Trump-Ishiba summit, and examines the outlook for India-Japan relations going forward.
The promise that a transformed relationship with Japan holds for India’s rise has been a central pillar of Indian foreign policy in the 21st century. However, three years after Shinzo Abe’s tragic demise, his special vision for the shared future of Asia’s leading maritime democracies is fading in the rearview mirror. Japan’s domestic politics and foreign policy have drifted in new directions. As Japan has become more embedded in a Western alliance mindset, the space and attention for India has shrunk.
The author observes that this moment of drift and uncertainty in Tokyo is hardly a desirable situation from India’s perspective, and goes on to analyse the political evolution of Japan in the post-Abe era (2020-2025). Japan has always privileged alliances, and in recent years its engagement with the global rise of Asia has become secondary to its US alliance commitments in Europe and elsewhere, resulting in a lower priority for the strategic partnership with India. Major changes in Japan’s domestic politics have also played a role in this process.
Against a backdrop of domestic political turmoil and low expectations, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba met with President Donald Trump in Washington D.C. on February 7, 2025. The business-like summit, which went as well as could have been expected, had a bilateral and Indo-Pacific focus, where Europe-Asia security linkages found no mention. This was also an indication to Japan to align itself with the new US policy direction being set by President Trump. Greater attention by Japan to the Indo-Pacific would be a welcome change for India.
Finally, the author turns to the outlook for India-Japan relations. He points out that India and Japan will always approach the world of escalating great power rivalry from their distinct national perspectives, but they can certainly work together to mitigate Indo-Pacific security challenges where their interests converge. There is need to re-instil greater ambition and energy to bilateral relations.
As leading Asian powers and strategic partners, India and Japan must redouble efforts to ensure that Asia’s future is not set back by military conflict, economic coercion, or authoritarian expansionism; pursue greater cooperation on economic security and emerging technologies; and sharpen their focus on building contemporary ties across the realms of language, culture, education, skills, mobility, and tourism.
The author concludes that while the Abe-era heyday of India-Japan bonhomie and leadership-driven relations is now behind us, lowering expectations from the vast potential of these ties will not serve the interests of either nation. It is still time for India and Japan to recall Shinzo Abe’s prescient vision and become the leading anchors of Asian stability and progress in the 21st century.
To read this DPG Policy Brief Vol. X, Issue 5, please click “Letter from Japan: The Tokyo Drift and India”.
In this brief, the author shares his impressions of the prevailing mood in Tokyo flowing from interactions at the Tokyo Global Dialogue VI hosted by The Japan Institute of International Affairs on January 29-30, 2025. He also outlines the changes in Japan’s policy orientation in the post-Abe era, assesses the Trump-Ishiba summit, and examines the outlook for India-Japan relations going forward.
The promise that a transformed relationship with Japan holds for India’s rise has been a central pillar of Indian foreign policy in the 21st century. However, three years after Shinzo Abe’s tragic demise, his special vision for the shared future of Asia’s leading maritime democracies is fading in the rearview mirror. Japan’s domestic politics and foreign policy have drifted in new directions. As Japan has become more embedded in a Western alliance mindset, the space and attention for India has shrunk.
The author observes that this moment of drift and uncertainty in Tokyo is hardly a desirable situation from India’s perspective, and goes on to analyse the political evolution of Japan in the post-Abe era (2020-2025). Japan has always privileged alliances, and in recent years its engagement with the global rise of Asia has become secondary to its US alliance commitments in Europe and elsewhere, resulting in a lower priority for the strategic partnership with India. Major changes in Japan’s domestic politics have also played a role in this process.
Against a backdrop of domestic political turmoil and low expectations, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba met with President Donald Trump in Washington D.C. on February 7, 2025. The business-like summit, which went as well as could have been expected, had a bilateral and Indo-Pacific focus, where Europe-Asia security linkages found no mention. This was also an indication to Japan to align itself with the new US policy direction being set by President Trump. Greater attention by Japan to the Indo-Pacific would be a welcome change for India.
Finally, the author turns to the outlook for India-Japan relations. He points out that India and Japan will always approach the world of escalating great power rivalry from their distinct national perspectives, but they can certainly work together to mitigate Indo-Pacific security challenges where their interests converge. There is need to re-instil greater ambition and energy to bilateral relations.
As leading Asian powers and strategic partners, India and Japan must redouble efforts to ensure that Asia’s future is not set back by military conflict, economic coercion, or authoritarian expansionism; pursue greater cooperation on economic security and emerging technologies; and sharpen their focus on building contemporary ties across the realms of language, culture, education, skills, mobility, and tourism.
The author concludes that while the Abe-era heyday of India-Japan bonhomie and leadership-driven relations is now behind us, lowering expectations from the vast potential of these ties will not serve the interests of either nation. It is still time for India and Japan to recall Shinzo Abe’s prescient vision and become the leading anchors of Asian stability and progress in the 21st century.
To read this DPG Policy Brief Vol. X, Issue 5, please click “Letter from Japan: The Tokyo Drift and India”.