DPG Policy Brief
Prabowo’s balancing visits to China and the US yield uneven outcomes
Authors Ambassador Biren Nanda
Date: November 28, 2024
The extended five nation tour undertaken by Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto from November 08-23, 2024, has underlined his plans to pursue a more vigorous foreign policy which reflects his vision for Indonesia’s role in global affairs, as well as his desire to play a more active role in multilateral forums. Prabowo has also sought membership in BRICS, marking a change from his predecessor’s hesitation.
This policy brief focuses on Prabowo’s visits to China and the United States, which signal an attempt at pragmatic balancing with regard to the US-China rivalry.
The author outlines the major outcomes of the Prabowo-Xi summit on November 09, the most significant among them being “an important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims” to be advanced under a Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee. This marks a breakthrough on the possible exploration of oil and gas in the “overlapping waters” around Indonesia’s Natuna Islands, as well as cooperation on fisheries which has been a point of contention.
Indonesia has never before acknowledged China’s claims in the North Natuna Sea, and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry has been quick to clarify that Jakarta remains firm in rejecting China’s “nine-dash line” which does not comply with UNCLOS.
However, it remains to be seen whether the summit Joint Statement marks a carefully crafted concession to China, albeit one couched in ambiguity.
Furthermore, in agreeing to forge an “exemplary comprehensive strategic partnership” with China, Indonesia has also endorsed Xi’s global initiatives - GDI, GSI, GCI and BRI - as well as its close alignment with China on developmental paths, cultural traditions and “Asian Values”. This has in effect blurred the distinction between Communist China and Asia’s second largest democracy.
Indonesia and China are to pursue a new pillar of security and defence cooperation under a Ministerial 2 2 mechanism, which will serve as the primary platform for high level strategic communication.
Finally, in yet another gesture to China, Prabowo also strongly endorsed Beijing’s positions on Taiwan and Xinjiang in their entirety.
In contrast, the outcomes of the Prabowo-Biden summit, which marked the 75th anniversary of US-Indonesia diplomatic relations, were rather modest and were focused predominantly on trade, investment, clean energy and development cooperation.
Significantly, Prabowo held a phone conversation with President-elect Trump prior to his summit meeting with President Biden on November 12, and the author suggests that with Trump’s return to power, Indonesia could possibly see more opportunities to expand ties between the two countries.
The author concludes that Prabowo can take considerable satisfaction from his substantive visits to China and the United States, even though they yielded uneven outcomes. However, fresh questions have now emerged regarding some ambiguity in Indonesia’s position on China’s maritime claims, which China is certain to exploit as it asserts its dominance in the South China Sea.
This policy brief focuses on Prabowo’s visits to China and the United States, which signal an attempt at pragmatic balancing with regard to the US-China rivalry.
The author outlines the major outcomes of the Prabowo-Xi summit on November 09, the most significant among them being “an important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims” to be advanced under a Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee. This marks a breakthrough on the possible exploration of oil and gas in the “overlapping waters” around Indonesia’s Natuna Islands, as well as cooperation on fisheries which has been a point of contention.
Indonesia has never before acknowledged China’s claims in the North Natuna Sea, and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry has been quick to clarify that Jakarta remains firm in rejecting China’s “nine-dash line” which does not comply with UNCLOS.
However, it remains to be seen whether the summit Joint Statement marks a carefully crafted concession to China, albeit one couched in ambiguity.
Furthermore, in agreeing to forge an “exemplary comprehensive strategic partnership” with China, Indonesia has also endorsed Xi’s global initiatives - GDI, GSI, GCI and BRI - as well as its close alignment with China on developmental paths, cultural traditions and “Asian Values”. This has in effect blurred the distinction between Communist China and Asia’s second largest democracy.
Indonesia and China are to pursue a new pillar of security and defence cooperation under a Ministerial 2 2 mechanism, which will serve as the primary platform for high level strategic communication.
Finally, in yet another gesture to China, Prabowo also strongly endorsed Beijing’s positions on Taiwan and Xinjiang in their entirety.
In contrast, the outcomes of the Prabowo-Biden summit, which marked the 75th anniversary of US-Indonesia diplomatic relations, were rather modest and were focused predominantly on trade, investment, clean energy and development cooperation.
Significantly, Prabowo held a phone conversation with President-elect Trump prior to his summit meeting with President Biden on November 12, and the author suggests that with Trump’s return to power, Indonesia could possibly see more opportunities to expand ties between the two countries.
The author concludes that Prabowo can take considerable satisfaction from his substantive visits to China and the United States, even though they yielded uneven outcomes. However, fresh questions have now emerged regarding some ambiguity in Indonesia’s position on China’s maritime claims, which China is certain to exploit as it asserts its dominance in the South China Sea.
Indonesia has moved closer to China, while the nature of its relations with the United States under the Trump presidency remains to be seen.
To read this DPG Policy Brief Vol. IX, Issue 25, please click “Prabowo’s balancing visits to China and the US yield uneven outcomes”.
